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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT (Optional)

FROM

NO

DATE

C/WBS

TO: Officer designation, room number, and
building

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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SR/ACOP

Rm. 5B4B03 HQ

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Chief, SR/ACOP

[Signature]

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10 SEP 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
TO: Deputy Director (Plans)
FROM: Implementation of Commercial Relationships Agreement (CIRA)
SUBJECT: Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence from Chairman, JCS (JCS-SEC-100, 100, 100) 2 August 1962, Subject as Above (Tab B)

1. This memorandum recommends action to the part of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, as stated in paragraph 2 below.

2. Background


a. Tab A contains a memorandum from C/WH to NS/P recommending that CIA accept, for planning purposes, that CIRA will be implemented at CIA or ERFCON 1 and that the NSC and JCS should jointly determine whether or not CIRA, "in fact," should be implemented.

b. Tab B contains a memorandum from NS/P to NSC recommending that the concept noted at "a," above, be approved.

c. Tab C contains a memorandum from NSC to Chairman, JCS, regarding the concept noted at "a," above, and requesting comments on the concept.

d. The subject reference (Tab B), the Chairman, JCS, recommended to the NSC and agreed that, for planning purposes, a joint effort for implementation of CIRA is logical. In addition, the NSC agreed that (1) it is essential that CIA Forces which have been activated for limited and specified operations be made available automatically in such circumstances upon the declaration of a world-wide emergency or ERFCON 1 situation which is large than world-wide, JCS-SEC 100 can jointly determine whether or not the CIA Forces should be activated; (2) in large covert paramilitary operations

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where CIA has a support role, regardless of declaration of HUKFOS I, HUKFOS II should clearly state whether or not the CIA Force should be included; and (4) Senior War Planners should identify, in each of their plans, the CIA elements to be included in the CIA Force.

2. The CIA will retain the principles under which the CIA supports military and paramilitary operations in a wartime situation where American Forces are actively engaged. A basic principle is that upon implementation of CMA, a CIA Force is organized under a CIA Commander and the Force commander maintains operational control of the Military on the same level as the Ground, Navy, and Air Force components involved in the conduct of operations. The CIA Commander is to be located in the CIA Force area those which are assigned by the DCI, and his technical and administrative control over the Force is analogous to the command by the Military Service Secretaries over their Service Component. Timing for activation of the Force is as noted above, that is, "where American Forces are actively engaged."

2. Our original proposal to JCS, regarding planning for implementation of CIA prior to commencement of hostilities, was based upon the belief that declaration of a DEFCON 1 or CDA would be preceded by discussions at the national level. During these discussions and prior to declaration of DEFCON 1, the Chairman, JCS, and the DCI would have jointly determined whether or not CIA would be implemented in DEFCON or CDA. The JCS have accepted the CIA concept of joint determination prior to declaration of a DEFCON 1 which is less than world-wide in scope. In view of this, the Chairman, JCS, indicated that he and other senior and qualified commanders to include in their joint decisions for recommending to JCS as to activation of the CIA Force, or elements thereof, whenever consideration is being given to implementing an operations plan. We believe, however, that the need for joint review at the time of recommendation is made to declare a world-wide DEFCON 1 is greater than if only one command area is to be affected. A major point to be considered is that a recommendation will be made to declare DEFCON 1, regardless of whether or not it is world-wide or restricted in scope. The recommendations will be made

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While the available information indicates that operating of intelligence is being provided. It does not mean that war is inevitable. It is important that we make the transition from peace to war, political responsibility will be in progress, and it may well be that CIA can best operate as an integrated agency in carrying out its national responsibilities, rather than under operational control of the several unified and specified commands. We believe that in areas, such as Latin America, Japan (South of the Sahara), and in some central nations, some elements of CIA might well be assigned from operational control of military commands, regardless of whether or not they have been assigned in place to the CIA Force. If, by Presidential decision, the authority could not come pending with an Ambassador and CIA is implemented, certain CIA field elements could well remain subject to direction of military authorities. In this regard, CIA plans must be more flexible as to the systems and know which the military should be assigned to the CIA Force. This is particularly important in those geographical areas where there is little chance of American Forces being actively engaged in combat operations.

3. It is for the above reasons that CIA must insist that when the question as to whether or not to declare DEFCON 1 is under discussion at national level, the interrelated question as to whether or not CIA will be implemented should be decided upon.

4. The JCS have provided for joint discussions to determine the support CIA can offer the Military in situations short of general war whether or not DEFCON 1 or "Defense Emergency" is declared. CIA plans have been based upon the principle that a joint determination would apply in such cases. The CIA Global War Plan states that plans must be sufficiently flexible to provide for the activation of a CIA Force. Plans will include only those assets within the limited war scope, for the support of CIA operations in support of military limited war operations.

4. Conclusions

5. CIA plans should contain provisions for the implementation of CIA at the declaration of DEFCON 1, but it should not be automatic. The timing and scope as to implementation of CIA and activation of the CIA Force should be determined jointly by the Chairman, JCS, and the NSC at the time national authorities are considering whether or not to declare DEFCON 1.

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h. In contingency situations short of general war where American forces are actively engaged, the CIA role in support of military operations will be as jointly agreed upon by the Chairman, JCS, and the NSC.

i. For planning purposes, CIA should include in its General War and Contingency Plans those elements of CIA which will contribute to the JCS Plans in support of military operations upon implementation of such plans.

4. Recommendations

a. That you approve the conclusions noted at paragraph 4, above.

b. That you sign the attached memorandum for the Chairman, John Clark of Staff.

c. This does not complete action on subject referenced. Upon your approval of the recommendations noted above, WPS will prepare the policy guidance necessary.


Chief, War Plans Staff

5. Attachments

1. A. JCS Staff
2. JCS Staff
3. JCS Staff
4. JCS Staff

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COORDINATION (in draft)

[] VN	20 Aug. 1963 Date
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[] VN/SEA	20 Aug. 1963 Date
[] VN/SEA	21 Aug. 1963 Date

WFO/SLO/REB Mangold/ph (7 Sept. 1963)

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